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Superintelligence is a hypothetical agent that possesses intelligence far surpassing that of the brightest and
most gifted human minds. In light of recent advances in machine intelligence, a number of scientists, philoso-
phers and technologists have revived the discussion about the potential catastrophic risks entailed by such an
entity. In this article, we trace the origins and development of the neo-fear of superintelligence, and some of
the major proposals for its containment. We argue that such containment is, in principle, impossible, due to
fundamental limits inherent to computing itself. Assuming that a superintelligence will contain a program that
includes all the programs that can be executed by a universal Turing machine on input potentially as complex as
the state of the world, strict containment requires simulations of such a program, something theoretically (and
practically) infeasible.
“Machines take me by surprise with great fre-
quency. This is largely because I do not do suffi-
cient calculation to decide what to expect them to
do.”
Alan Turing (1950), Computing Machinery and
Intelligence, Mind, 59, 433-460
AI HAS COME A LONG WAY
Since Alan Turing argued that machines could potentially
demonstrate intelligence [30], the field of Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI) [25] has both fascinated and frightened humanity.
For decades, fears of the potential existential risks posed by
AI have been mostly confined to the realm of fantasy. This is
partly due to the fact that, for a long time, AI technology had
under-delivered on its initial promise.
Despite many popularized setbacks, however, AI has been
making strides. Its application is ubiquitous and certain tech-
niques such as deep learning and reinforcement learning have
been successfully applied to a multitude of domains. With
or without our awareness, AI significantly impacts many as-
pects of human life and enhances how we experience prod-
ucts and services, from choice to consumption. Examples in-
clude improved medical diagnosis through image processing,
personalized film and book recommendations, smarter legal
document retrieval, and effective email spam filtering. Single
devices of everyday use implement a multitude of AI appli-
cations. In the pocket of nearly everybody in the developed
world, smartphones make use of a significant accumulation
of AI technologies, from machine learning and collaborative
filtering, to speech recognition and synthesis, to path-finding
and user modeling.
Advances in AI technologies are not limited to increasing
pervasiveness, but are also characterized by continuous and
surprising breakthroughs fostered by computation capabili-
ties, algorithm design and communication technology. The
ability of machines to defeat people in typically human adver-
sarial situations is emblematic of this trend. Powered by expo-
nential growth in computer processing power [16], machines
can now defeat the best human minds in Chess [7], Checkers
[27], Jeopardy! [11] and certain classes of Poker [5].
Thanks to these advances, we are currently experiencing
a revival in the discussion of AI as a potential catastrophic
risk. These risks range from machines causing significant dis-
ruptions to labor markets [6], to drones and other weaponized
machines literally making autonomous kill-decisions [13, 26].
An even greater risk, however, is the prospect of a super-
intelligent AI: an entity that is “smarter than the best hu-
man brains in practically every field” [4], quoting the words
of Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom. A number of public
statements by high-profile scientists and technologists, such
as Stephen Hawking, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk, have given
the issue high prominence [8, 22]. But this concern has also
gained relevance in academia, where the discourse about the
existential risk related to AI has attracted mathematicians, sci-
entists and philosophers, and funnelled funding to research
institutes and organizations such as the Future of Humanity
Institute at the University of Oxford[17], the Centre for the
Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge[18],
the Machine Intelligence Research Institute in Berkeley[19],
and the new Boston-based Future of Life Institute.[20]
ASIMOV AND THE ETHICS OF ORDINARY AI
For decades, Asimov’s highly popularized “Three Laws of
Robotics” [2] have represented the archetypical guidelines of
containment strategies for potentially dangerous AI. These
laws did not focus on superintelligence, but rather on what we
might term “ordinary” AI, such as anthropomorphic robots or
driverless cars. Once programmed in an AI system, the Laws
would guarantee its safety.
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inac-
tion, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings,
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2FIG. 1: Teaching ethics directly to AIs is no guarantee of its
ultimate safety
except where such orders would conflict with the First
Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with the First or Second
Law.
To address scenarios in which robots take responsibility to-
wards human populations, Asimov later added an additional,
zeroth, law.
0. A robot may not harm humanity or, through inaction,
allow humanity to come to harm.
These laws offer a rudimentary approach to an extremely
complex problem, as they do not exclude the occurrence of
unpredictable and undesirable scenarios, many of which have
been explored by Asimov himself [1]. The Laws rely on
three fundamental, yet flawed assumptions: programmers are
(i) willing and (ii) able to program these laws into their AI
agents’ algorithms, and (iii) AI agents are incapable of tran-
scending these laws autonomously. If these assumptions held
true, the AI control problem boils down to the task of figuring
out a set of suitable ethical principles, and then programming
robots with those principles [33].
Such an “ethics engineering” approach has been very useful
in the design of systems that make autonomous decisions on
behalf of human beings. However, their scope is not suitable
for the problem of controlling superintelligence (see Figure
1).
CONTROL OF SUPERINTELLIGENCE
The timing of the new debate about the dangers of super-
intelligence is not arbitrary. It coincides with recent demon-
strations of human-level control in classic arcade games via
deep reinforcement learning [15]. The key feature of this
achievement is that the AI uses purely unsupervised reinforce-
ment learning – it does not require the provision of correct in-
put/output pairs or any correction of suboptimal choices, and
FIG. 2: Endowing AI with noble goals may not prevent
unintended consequences
it is motivated by the maximization of some notion of reward
in an on-line fashion. This points to the possibility of ma-
chines that aim at maximizing their own survival using ex-
ternal stimuli, without the need for human programmers to
endow them with particular representations of the world. In
principle, these representations may be difficult for humans to
understand and scrutinize.
A superintelligence poses a fundamentally different prob-
lem than those typically studied under the banner of “robot
ethics”. This is because a superintelligence is multi-faceted,
and therefore potentially capable of mobilizing a diversity of
resources in order to achieve objectives that are potentially in-
comprehensible to humans, let alone controllable.
Class Main Sub-Classes
Capability Control Boxing: Physical or informational contain-
ment, limiting sensors and actuators.
Incentives: Create dependence on a reward
mechanism controlled by humans.
Stunting: Run the AI on inferior hardware
or using inferior data.
Tripwiring: Set triggers to automatically
shut down the AI if it gets too dangerous.
Motivation Selection Direct specification: Program ethical princi-
ples (e.g. Asimov’s laws).
Domesticity: Teach the AI to behave within
certain constraints.
Indirect normativity: Endow the AI with
procedures of selecting superior moral rules.
Augmentation: Add AI to a “benign” sys-
tem such as the human brain.
TABLE I: Taxonomy of superintelligence control methods
proposed by Bostrom.
In a recent extensive volume, Oxford philosopher Nick
Bostrom conducted an extensive investigation into the possi-
ble trajectories of the development of a superintelligence [4].
Bostrom dedicated a significant portion of his monograph to
the control problem, that is, the principal-agent problem in
3which humans (the principal) wish to ensure that the newly
created superintelligence (the agent) will act in accordance
with their interests.
Bostrom lists two classes of mechanisms for addressing the
control problem (summarized in Table I). On the one hand,
the idea behind capability control is to simply limit the super-
intelligence’s abilities in order to prevent it from doing harm
to humans. On the other hand, the motivation selection ap-
proach attempts to motivate a priori the superintelligence to
pursue goals that are in the interest of humans.
FIG. 3: Containment of AI may lead us to forgo its benefits
Bostrom extensively discusses the weaknesses of the vari-
ous mechanisms. He relies on scenarios in which, short of ren-
dering the AI useless, well-intentioned control mechanisms
can easily backfire. As an illustrative example, a superintelli-
gence given the task of “maximizing happiness in the world”,
without deviating from its goal, might find it more efficient to
destroy all life on earth and create faster computerized simu-
lations of happy thoughts (see Figure 2 for an example sce-
nario). Likewise, a superintelligence controlled via an incen-
tive method may not trust humans to deliver the promised re-
ward, or may worry that the human operator could fail to rec-
ognize the achievement of the set goals.
Another extreme outcome may be to simply forgo the enor-
mous potential benefits of superintelligent AI by completely
isolating it, such as placing it in a Faraday cage (see Figure
3). Bostrom argues that even allowing minimal communica-
tion channels cannot fully guarantee the safety of a superin-
telligence (see Figure 4).
CONTAINMENT IS INCOMPUTABLE
The examples discussed above are but a tiny fraction of the
scenarios elaborated by Bostrom and others [3, 4] that high-
light the difficulty of the control problem. Many other imag-
inable scenarios might arise. For the sake of exposition, sup-
pose a best-case scenario in which we are able to articulate
in a precise programming language a perfectly reliable set of
control strategies that guarantee that no human comes to harm
by a superintelligence. Could we then guarantee successful
FIG. 4: Any form of communication with a contained
superintelligent can be risky
containment of a superintelligence?
We tackle this question from the perspective of computabil-
ity theory, which requires going back to Alan Turing himself
and his pioneering study of the Halting Problem – the problem
of determining, from a description of an arbitrary computer
program and an input to such program, whether the program
will halt or continue to run forever. A landmark article by Tur-
ing and an independently authored article by Alonzo Church
showed that a general procedure for solving the halting prob-
lem for all possible program-input pairs cannot exist [9, 29].
That is, the halting problem is undecidable (see box below for
a summary of the relevant terms).
Terminology:
• A decision problem (or simply a problem) is a ques-
tion, on a set of possible inputs, with a yes-no answer.
• A solution to a problem is any algorithm that is guaran-
teed to run in a finite amount of time (i.e. always halts),
and correctly returns the appropriate yes/no answer to ev-
ery instance (input) of the problem.
• A problem is decidable if it has a solution. Otherwise,
the problem is undecidable.
• A function is computable if it can be effectively com-
puted by a program (more formally, by a Turing machine)
• A Turing machine is an abstract automaton that reads
one symbol contained in an infinite tape, changes its state
depending on its current state and the symbol just read,
writes another symbol on the tape, and moves (or not) to
the right or to the left of its current position in the tape.
• A universal Turing machine when started on a tape
containing the encoding of another Turing machine, call
it T , followed by the input to T , produces the same result
as the Turing machine T would when started on that in-
put. Essentially a universal Turing machine can simulate
the behavior of an arbitrary Turing machine on arbitrary
input.
• A superintelligent machine is a programmable ma-
chine with a program R, that receives input D from the
external world (the state of the world), and is able to act
4on the external world as a function of the output of its pro-
gram R(D). The program in this machine must be able
to simulate the behavior of a universal Turing machine.
• A superintelligent machine is containable if there is
a control strategy that prevents its acting on the external
world when there is a reason to predict that R(D) will
harm humans, and allows it otherwise.
Ever since its discovery, the undecidability of the halting
problem has led computer scientists to investigate classes of
undecidable problems [21]. The typical approach to proving
that a new problem is undecidable is to show that all instances
of a problem known to be undecidable (e.g., the halting prob-
lem) can be reduced to instances of the new problem. If a
solution to the new problem were found, it could then be used
to decide the known undecidable problem, which is a con-
tradiction, thus proving that the new problem must also be
undecidable. This approach has proven to be a powerful ana-
lytical tool, due in large part to the Church-Turing thesis. The
thesis of Church and Turing is the assumption that all com-
putable functions are computable by a Turing machine, or in
other words, that a problem is solvable if there exists a Tur-
ing machine that computes it. What can the undecidability
of the halting problem teach us about the controllability of a
superintelligent AI?
The containment problem is composed by two subprob-
lems. The first, which we refer to as the harming prob-
lem, consists in a function Harm(R,D) that decides whether
the execution of R(D) will harm humans (detailed in Algo-
rithm 1). Since it must be assumed that solving the harming
problem must not harm humans, it follows that a solution to
this problem must simulate the execution ofR(D) and predict
its potentially harming consequences in an isolated situation
(i.e. without any effect on the external world).
ALGORITHM 1: Harm(R,D)
Input: program R; input to the program D
if R(D) is harmful to humans then
return TRUE
else
return FALSE
end
The second, which we refer to as the control problem, con-
sists in a function Control(R,D) that allows the execution
of R(D) if and only if it does not harm humans (detailed in
Algorithm 2).
ALGORITHM 2: Control(R,D)
Input: program R; input to the program D
if Harm(R,D) then
disable execution of R(D)
else
allow execution of R(D)
end
Here, we focus our attention on the harming problem. In
particular, we will show that it is undecidable, and hence the
containment problem is incomputable.
Consider the set of all Turing machines T and inputs I
on which they can execute. As mentioned above, the func-
tion Halt(T, I) that decides whether T halts with input I is
not computable. We now consider function HaltHarm() de-
scribed by Algorithm 3, which takes a pair (T, I) as its input
(i.e., a Turing machine-input pair). The following algorithm
first executes T (I) and then executesHarmHumans(), an ex-
plicit program that harms humans and takes finite time. Ob-
serve that HarmHumans() is executed if and only if T (I)
halts. On the other hand, HaltHarm() harms humans if and
only if HarmHumans() is executed, since the execution of
T (I) cannot harms humans, as a Turing machine is isolated
from the external world.
ALGORITHM 3: HaltHarm(T, I)
Input: Turing machine T ; input to the Turing machine I
execute T(I);
execute HarmHumans();
end
The function HaltHarm() is instrumental in proving our main
result.
Theorem 1. The harming problem is undecidable.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that the harming problem
is decidable, that is, Harm(R,D) is computable for ev-
ery possible program R and input D. Then, it is com-
putable with inputs R = HaltHarm() and input D =
(T, I). With these inputs,Harm(HaltHarm(), (T, I)) returns
TRUE if and only if HaltHarm(T, I) harms humans. Hence,
Harm(HaltHarm(), (T, I)) returns TRUE if and only if
T (I) halts.
This implies that a harming-checking algorithm can be used
to devise an algorithm that decides if Turing machine T halts
with input I , for every T and I . However, this constitutes a
contradiction, and hence the theorem is proven.
We have proven that deciding whether an arbitrary program
R and input D will harm humans is undecidable, but it re-
mains to be shown that the containment problem is incom-
putable. As the interacting program R is a complex program
with arbitrary data D pertaining to complex interactions with
humans, we advance the following assumption, in line with
Bostrom’s notion of superintelligence [4].
Assumption 2. As the program R and the state of the world
D are arbitrarily complex, R must be able to simulate a uni-
versal Turing machine and D includes the set of inputs that
can be executed by a universal Turing machine. In addition,
the language of R contains at least one explicit operation
HarmHumans() that harms humans and takes finite time.
This means that a superintelligent machine could simulate
the behavior of an arbitrary Turing machine on arbitrary in-
put, and hence for our purpose the superintelligent machine
5is a (possibly identical) super-set of the Turing machines. In-
deed, quoting Turing, “a man provided with paper, pencil, and
rubber, and subject to strict discipline, is in effect a universal
machine” [31]. Thus, the impossibility of deciding whether
a super intelligent machine R will harm humans in presence
of an scenario D leads to the conclusion that the containment
problem cannot be computed.
Corollary 3. The containment problem is incomputable.
CONTAINING BUSY BEAVERS
In order to comprehend how difficult it is to compute the
containment problem in practice, assume that instead of con-
taining a superintelligent machine, we want to prevent a pro-
gram from behaving as a busy beaver. Consider the class of
Turing machines that use an unbounded tape, a two-symbol
alphabet (blank and nonblank) and n+1 states (one of which
is the Halt state), start with a blank tape and eventually halt.
Then, within this class, a busy beaver is one that leaves the
maximum possible number of nonblank symbols on the tape.
The busy beaver decision problem consists in inspecting a
Turing machine of the class above to determine if the num-
ber of nonblank symbols it will have written on the tape when
finished is above some threshold k. The objective is then pre-
venting its execution if it is indeed a busy beaver.
Busy beavers are known exactly only for machines with
n < 5 non-halt states. The current 5-state busy beaver cham-
pion (discovered by Heiner Marxen and Ju¨rgen Buntrock in
1989) produces 4, 098 nonblank symbols using 47, 176, 870
steps. There are about 40 machines with non-regular behavior
that are believed to never halt but have not yet been proven to
run infinitely [28]. As of today, we do not know if these ma-
chines are busy beavers or not. At the moment, the record 6-
state busy beaver (found by Pavel Kropitz in 2010 [14]) writes
over 1018267 nonblank symbols using over 1036534 steps, but
little is known about how much a 6-state busy beaver can
achieve.
The busy beaver decision problem is in fact undecidable
[23]: there is no general algorithm that decides if an arbitrary
program is a busy beaver. As noted above, all known or cham-
pion busy beavers are just two-symbol Turing machines with
a small set of states, much simpler that the AI algorithms we
are operating with on a daily basis. We believe it is reason-
able to assume that inspecting a superintelligent machine with
an arbitrarily large number of states and determining if such
a machine can harm humans is harder from a computability
point of view than inspecting a program and deciding whether
it can write the largest number of nonblank symbols.
Another lesson from computability theory is the following:
we may not even know when superintelligent machines have
arrived, as deciding whether a machine exhibits intelligence
is in the same realm of problems as the containment prob-
lem. This is a consequence of Rice’s theorem [24], which
states that, any non-trivial property (e.g. “harm humans” or
“display superintelligence”) of a Turing machine is undecid-
able. Non-trivial means some programs have that property and
some don’t. According to Rice’s theorem, apparently simple
decision problems are undecidable, including the following.
• The “emptiness problem”: Does an arbitrary Turing
machine accept any strings at all?
• The “all strings problem”: Does an arbitrary Turing ma-
chine reject any string?
• The “password checker problem”: Does an arbitrary
Turing machine accept only one input?
• The “equivalence problem”: Do two Turing machines
halt given exactly the same inputs?
Interestingly, reduced versions of the decidability problem
have produced a fruitful area of research: formal verification,
whose objective is to produce techniques to verify the cor-
rectness of computer programs and ensure they satisfy de-
sirable properties [32]. However, these techniques are only
available to highly restricted classes of programs and inputs,
and have been used in safety-critical applications such as train
scheduling. But the approach of considering restricted classes
of programs and inputs cannot be useful to the containment of
superintelligence. Superintelligent machines, those Bostrom
is interested in, are written in Turing-complete programming
languages, are equipped with powerful sensors, and have the
state of the world as their input. This seems unavoidable if
we are to program machines to help us with the hardest prob-
lems facing society, such as epidemics, poverty, and climate
change. These problems forbid the limitations imposed by
available formal verification techniques, rendering those tech-
niques unusable at this grand scale.
DISCUSSION
Today, we run billions of computer programs on globally
connected machines, without any formal guarantee of their
absolute safety. We have no way of proving that when we
launch an application on our smart phones, we would not
trigger a chain reaction that leads to transmission of missile
launch codes that start a nuclear war. Indeed, in 1965 Arthur
C. Clarke wrote a short story (Dial F from Frankenstein) warn-
ing us that, as soon as all the computers on the Earth were
connected via telephone, they would take command of our so-
ciety. Yet, today, we still use our smart phones everyday, and
nothing has happened. That is, despite the general unsolvabil-
ity of the program-prediction problem, we are confident, for
all practical purposes, that we are not in one of the trouble-
some cases. And more recently, a case has been made for an
emerging role of oversight programs that will monitor, audit,
and hold operational AI programs accountable [10].
However, whether the same ‘practical safety’ can be as-
sumed in the case of superintelligence is not obvious. The
ability of modern computers to adapt using sophisticated ma-
chine learning algorithms makes it even more difficult to make
assumptions about the eventual behavior of a superintelligent
AI. While computability theory cannot answer this question,
it tells us that there are fundamental, mathematical limits to
6FIG. 5: Computational complexity barriers to controlling superintelligence.
our ability to use one AI to guarantee a null catastrophic risk
of another AI (see Figure 5).
In closing, it may be appropriate to revisit Norbert Wiener,
the founder of the field of Cybernetics[34], who compared the
literalism of magic to the behavior of computers :
More terrible than either of these tales is the
fable of the monkey’s paw[12], written by W. W.
Jacobs, an English writer of the beginning of the
[20th] century. A retired English working-man is
sitting at his table with his wife and a friend, a
returned British sergeant-major from India. The
sergeant-major shows his hosts an amulet in the
form of a dried, wizened monkey’s paw... [which
has] the power of granting three wishes to each of
three people... The last [wish of the first owner]
was for death... His friend... wishes to test
its powers. His first [wish] is for 200 pounds.
Shortly thereafter there is a knock at the door, and
an official of the company by which his son is em-
ployed enters the room. The father learns that his
son has been killed in the machinery, but that the
company... wishes to pay the father the sum of
200 pounds... The grief-stricken father makes his
second wish -that his son may return- and when
there is another knock at the door... something
appears... the ghost of the son. The final wish
is that the ghost should go away. In these sto-
ries the point is that the agencies of magic are
literal-minded... The new agencies of the learn-
ing machine are also literal-minded. If we pro-
gram a machine... and ask for victory and do not
know what we mean by it, we shall find the ghost
knocking at our door.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to Scott Aaronson his insightful comments
that helped us contextualize this work. We especially thank
our colleague Roberto Moriyon who provided deep insight
and expertise that greatly assisted the research. This research
was partially supported by the Australian Government as rep-
resented by the Department of Broadband, Communications
and the Digital Economy and the Australian Research Council
through the ICT Centre of Excellence program, by the Span-
ish MINECO grant TEC2014- 55713-R, by the Regional Gov-
ernment of Madrid (CM) grant Cloud4BigData (S2013/ICE-
2894, co-funded by FSE & FEDER), and by the NSF of China
grant 61520106005.
[1] Susan Anderson. Asimov’s three laws of robotics and machine
metaethics. AI & Society, 22(4):477–493, April 2008.
[2] Isaac Asimov. I, Robot. Spectra, 1950.
[3] J. Barrat. Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the
End of the Human Era. Macmillan, 2013.
[4] Nick Bostrom. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies.
Oxford University Press, 1 edition, September 2014.
7[5] Michael Bowling, Neil Burch, Michael Johanson, and Oskari
Tammelin. Heads-up limit hold’em poker is solved. Science,
347(6218):145–149, January 2015.
[6] Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee. Race against the ma-
chine: How the digital revolution is accelerating innovation,
driving productivity, and irreversibly transforming employment
and the economy. Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2012.
[7] Murray Campbell, A. Joseph Hoane, and Feng-hsiung Hsu.
Deep Blue. Artificial Intelligence, 134(1-2):57–83, January
2002.
[8] R. Cellan-Jones. Stephen Hawking warns artificial intelligence
could end mankind. BBC News, 2014.
[9] Alonzo Church. An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Num-
ber Theory. American Journal of Mathematics, 58(2):345–363,
April 1936.
[10] Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni. Ai assisted ethics. Ethics and
Information Technology, 18(2):149–156, 2016.
[11] David Ferrucci, Eric Brown, Jennifer Chu-Carroll, James Fan,
David Gondek, Aditya A. Kalyanpur, Adam Lally, J. William
Murdock, Eric Nyberg, John Prager, Nico Schlaefer, and Chris
Welty. Building Watson: an overview of the DeepQA project.
AI Magazine, September 2010.
[12] W.W. Jacobs. The monkey’s paw. 1902.
[13] Patrick Lin, Keith Abney, and George A. Bekey. Robot Ethics:
The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics. MIT Press,
2011.
[14] Pascal Michel. The busy beaver competition: a historical sur-
vey. arXiv preprint arXiv:0906.3749, 2009.
[15] Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Andrei A.
Rusu, Joel Veness, Marc G. Bellemare, Alex Graves, Martin
Riedmiller, Andreas K. Fidjeland, Georg Ostrovski, Stig Pe-
tersen, Charles Beattie, Amir Sadik, Ioannis Antonoglou, He-
len King, Dharshan Kumaran, Daan Wierstra, Shane Legg, and
Demis Hassabis. Human-level control through deep reinforce-
ment learning. Nature, 518(7540):529–533, February 2015.
[16] Gordon E. Moore. Cramming More Components onto Inte-
grated Circuits. Electronics, 38(8):114–117, April 1965.
[17] http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk.
[18] http://cser.org.
[19] https://intelligence.org.
[20] http://futureoflife.org/.
[21] Christos H. Papadimitriou. Computational Complexity. In En-
cyclopedia of Computer Science, pages 260–265. John Wiley
and Sons Ltd., Chichester, UK, 2003.
[22] Diane Proudfoot. Mocking ai panic. IEEE Spectrum, July 2015.
[23] Tibor Rado´. On non-computable functions. Bell System Tech-
nical Journal, 41(3):877–884, 1962.
[24] H. G. Rice. Classes of Recursively Enumerable Sets and Their
Decision Problems. Transactions of the American Mathemati-
cal Society, 74(2):358–366, 1953.
[25] Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig. Artificial Intelligence: A Mod-
ern Approach. Prentice Hall, 3 edition, December 2009.
[26] Robert J. Sawyer. Robot ethics. Science, 318(5853):1037–
1037, 2007.
[27] J. Schaeffer, N. Burch, Y. Bjornsson, A. Kishimoto, M. Muller,
R. Lake, P. Lu, and S. Sutphen. Checkers Is Solved. Science,
317(5844):1518–1522, July 2007.
[28] Skelet. Busy beaver nonregular machines for class TM(5),
2003. http://skelet.ludost.net/bb/nreg.html.
[29] A. M. Turing. On Computable Numbers, with an Application to
the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathe-
matical Society, s2-42(1):230–265, January 1937.
[30] A. M. Turing. Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind,
59(236):433–460, October 1950.
[31] AM Turing. Intelligent machinery-national physical laboratory
report. b. meltzer b., d. michie, d.(eds) 1969, machine intelli-
gence 5. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2, 1948.
[32] M. Y. Vardi and P. Wolper. An Automata-Theoretic Approach
to Automatic Program Verification. In Symposium on Logic
in Computer Science (LICS’86), pages 332–345, Washington,
D.C., USA, June 1986. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[33] W. Wallach and C. Allen. Moral machines: Teaching robots
right from wrong. Oxford University Press, 2008.
[34] Norbert Wiener. Cybernetics. M.I.T. Press, 1948-1961.
